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Abstract
This paper measures the eect of extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) benets
on the unemployment rate using a calibrated structural model that features job search and
consumption-saving decision, skill depreciation, UI eligibility, and UI benet extensions
that capture what has happened during the current downturn. I nd that the extensions of
UI benets contributed to an increase in the unemployment rate by 1.2 percentage points,
which is about a quarter of an observed increase during the current downturn (a 5.1 per-
centage point increase from 4.8 percent at the end of 2007 to 9.9 percent in the fall of
2009). Among the remaining 3.9 percentage points, 2.4 percentage points are due to the
large increase in the separation rate, while the staggering job-nding probability contributes
1.4 percentage points. The last extension in December 2010 moderately slows down the
recovery of the unemployment rate. Specically, the model indicates that the last extension
keeps the unemployment rate higher by up to 0.4 percentage point during 2011.
JEL Classication: J64, J65, E24, D83
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance, Extension, Labor Market, Search, Consumption
Smoothing
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11 Introduction
This paper measures the eect of extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) benets on the
unemployment rate using a calibrated structural model of job search. Facing the most severe
recession since the Great Depression, the U.S. government enacted a series of extensions of UI
benets that provide an unemployed worker with the maximum of 99 weeks of UI benets,
compared with the regular duration of 26 weeks. While these extensions are one of the responses
to the unemployment rate that reached 10 percent in late 2009, which was the second time
this happened since 1982-83 in the postwar U.S. history, it is also possible that the extensions
themselves contributed to the rising unemployment rate by encouraging jobless workers to remain
unemployed so that they received the UI benets for an extended duration and by discouraging
the unemployed to search for a job intensively.
Although there are existing attempts to measure the eect of UI benet extensions on the
unemployment rate, this paper is the only one that uses a structural model to answer the question.
The structural approach employed in this paper has two distinctive advantages. First, although
the maximum duration of 99 weeks is often seen in the headlines, it does not mean that all
unemployed workers are eligible for the maximum duration. To the contrary, the maximum
duration of UI benets for each jobless worker is increased gradually with a series of extensions.
Moreover, the extensions are temporary. Using a structural model and replicating the extensions
in the model allow me to take into account the gradual and temporary nature of the extensions.
Second, with a calibrated structural model at hand, I can implement counterfactual experiments.
For example, I will evaluate how the last extension in December 2010 aects the path of the
unemployment rate in the future.
I nd that the ongoing extensions of UI benets contributed to an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate by 1.2 percentage points. Since the unemployment rate went up by 5.1 percentage
points, from 4.8 percent before the current downturn started at the end of 2007 to 9.9 percent
in the fall of 2009, the contribution of the series of UI benet extensions is close to a quarter
(24 percent). Among the remaining 3.9 percentage points, 2.4 percentage points are due to the
large increase in the separation rate, while the staggering job-nding probability contributes by
1.4 percentage points. I also nd that the last extension slows down the recovery of the un-
employment rate; the model indicates that the last extension in December of 2010 keeps the
unemployment rate higher, by up to 0.4 percentage point during 2011, and the economy reaches
an unemployment rate of 6 percent one month later because of the last extension.
There are other studies that use the empirical approach to quantify the eect of UI benet
extensions on the unemployment rate and the number obtained in this paper (1.2 percentage
points) is within the range of estimates obtained by other studies. Valletta and Kuang (2010)
use the Current Population Survey (CPS) and measure the increase in the number of involuntary
job losers as well as the average duration of unemployment of the job losers during the current
downturn in order to quantify the impact that UI benet extensions have on the unemployment
rate. The increase in the number of involuntary job losers aects the unemployment rate strongly
because they tend to stay in the labor force and search for a job. They conclude that the UI
benet extensions contribute to a modest 0.4 percentage point to the unemployment rate when
it reached 10 percent. Since they do not explicitly consider the behavioral channel by which
the job search intensity is discouraged by generous UI benets, their estimate probably under-
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from unemployment during 2004-2007 and during 2009-2010 and uses the changes in the escape
probabilities, especially the changes in the \spikes" around the time of UI benet exhaustion, to
quantify the eect of UI benet extensions on the unemployment rate. He nds that UI benet
extensions contribute to an increase of 0.8-1.8 percentage points to the unemployment rate. He
also quanties the relative importance of the lower job nding rate (escape to employment) and
the lower probability of exiting the labor force (escape to out-of-labor-force), and nds that the
latter is much less signicant. His nding support the abstraction of the labor force participation
decision in the model used in this paper.
There is a long list of literature that tries try to quantify the eect of the level and duration
of UI benets on unemployment duration. Regarding the level of UI benets, existing estimates
are in the rage of a 0.5-1.5 week increase in average duration of UI-eligible workers associated
with a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate of UI benets. All estimates listed
below are obtained by estimating the hazard function out of unemployment, but the dierence
arises because of the data, estimation methodology, and the sample period. Hamermesh (1977)
concludes that \the best estimate { if one chooses a single gure { is that a 10 percentage
point increase in the gross replacement rate leads to an increase in the duration of insured
unemployment of about half a week when labor markets are tight." Mott and Nicholson
(1982) nd that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate is associated with an
increase in unemployment duration of about 0.8-1.0 week. Meyer (1990) estimates the eect to
be an increase of 1.0-1.5 weeks of average unemployment duration. Mott (1985) obtains the
eect to be a 0.5 week increase in potential duration.
Regarding the eect of an increase in the duration of UI benets on the average unemployment
spell, existing estimates are in the range of a 0.1-0.2 week increase in average unemployment du-
ration in response to a one-week increase in the duration of UI benets. Mott (1985) estimates
the eect of a one-week extension of UI benets to be about a 0.15 week increase in the average
unemployment spell of UI recipients. Mott and Nicholson (1982) estimate the eect to be 0.1
week. The estimate obtained by Katz and Meyer (1990) is a 0.16-0.20 week increase in the av-
erage duration of unemployment spells by UI recipients. More recently, Card and Levine (2000)
obtain the smallest estimate. They use the UI benet extension of 13 weeks in New Jersey that
lasted for six months and estimate the eect of a one-week increase in UI benets on the average
unemployment duration to be 0.08 week.
The strength of the response of unemployment duration or the unemployment rate to changes
in either the level or duration of UI benets has a strong policy implication because it aects
the optimal properties of the UI system. Simply put, the stronger this moral hazard eect from
more generous UI system is, the less generous the optimal UI benet should be. The literature
identies three kinds of benets from UI { (1) consumption smoothing, (2) the liquidity eect
on search intensity, and (3) better resulting matches because jobless workers are less desperate
when they have generous UI benets { and two kinds of costs from unemployment insurance
{ (1) moral hazard and (2) skill depreciation. Gruber (1997) studies the positive role of UI
for consumption smoothing. He estimates that, in the absence of UI, the consumption of the
unemployed would fall by 22 percent, which is three times the average fall in the presence of
the UI program. The liquidity eect is emphasized by Chetty (2008), and the positive eect on
3the match quality is analyzed by Diamond (1981) and more recently by Acemoglu and Shimer
(2000) using a structural macroeconomic model. The skill depreciation is the main focus of
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) in explaining the dynamics of unemployment in Europe. Fujita
(2011) incorporates skill depreciation in the standard labor search framework.
The model used in this paper is based on the model developed by Mortensen (1977) and
Chetty (2008). While the model abstract from the decision of accepting an oer, the model is
extended in the following ways: First, a stylized version of UI benet extensions is introduced
and the equilibrium transition path involving policy changes and time-varying separation and
job-nding rates is solved. Second, skill depreciation during unemployment spells is introduced.
Third, eligibility for UI benets is taken into account to capture the fact that only about half
of the unemployed are receiving UI benets in normal times. Fourth, the number of vacancy
postings is endogenized in the standard way of the Mortensen-Pissarides model (Pissarides (1985),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)).
The rest of the paper is proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the ongoing extensions of
UI benet and discuss how they are stylized to be incorporated into the model. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 4 discusses how the model is calibrated. Section 5 describes the computational
methods used to solve the model. Section 6 presents the results based on the steady-state analysis.
Section 7 presents the main results of the paper, using equilibrium transition analysis. Section 8
concludes.
2 Unemployment Benet Extension: Facts
Although standard UI benets last 26 weeks in most states, the government often enacts exten-
sions of UI benets during economic downturns.1 There are two types of extensions, both of
which have been activated during the current downturn. Remember that, under both types of
extensions, the level of benets is the same as the level for the regular benets.
The rst type of extension is called the extended benets (EB) program. It is a permanent
program that is automatically activated for a state whenever the unemployment rate of that state
reaches a certain level.2 The EB program provides an additional 13 or 20 weeks of UI benets for
most states if the unemployment rate of the state exceeds 6.5 percent or 8.0 percent, respectively.
Currently, a majority of states qualify for the 20 weeks of extended UI benets under the EB
program. To give the idea of the approximate timing when the extended UI benets under the
EB program became available, let's use the national average unemployment rate. The national
average unemployment rate exceeded the threshold for the 13 weeks of extended benets under
the EB program (6.5 percent) in November 2008. The national unemployment rate went above
the threshold for 20 weeks of extended benets under the EB program (8.0 percent) in March
2009. Since then, the national average unemployment rate remained above the threshold for the
20-week UI benet extension.
The second type of extension is not automatic; Congress enacts this type of extension tem-
porarily in response to severe downturns. The latest program in this category, the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation program (EUC08), represents the eighth time Congress has cre-
1 This section is based on the description of UI benet extensions by Fujita (2010a)
2 To be more precise, the three-month average of the unemployment rate of the state is used.
4Table 1: Recent Extensions of UI Benets.1
Date Description
June 30, 2008 The EUC08 program was introduced. The maximum duration of the
additional benets under the program was 13 weeks. It is called Tier-1
of extended UI benets. The expiration date was set for March 28,
2009.
November 21, 2008 The maximum entitlement under Tier-1 was extended from 13 to 20
weeks. Tier-2, which provides a maximum of 13 weeks of additional UI
benets in states with an unemployment rate of at least 6 percent, was
introduced. The expiration date remained at March 28, 2009.
February 17, 2009 As part of the American Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the
expiration date was pushed back to December 26, 2009. The act also
included a provision to pay an additional weekly benet of 25 dollars
to those receiving extended UI benets under the EUC08.
November 6, 2009 The duration of additional UI benets was substantially expanded.
Tier-1 remained 20 weeks, but Tier-2 was expanded to 14 weeks and no
longer depends on the state unemployment rate. A newly introduced
Tier-3 provides an additional 13 weeks of benets for those in states
with an unemployment rate of at least 6 percent, and another newly
introduced Tier-4 provides an additional six weeks for states with an
unemployment rate higher than 8.5 percent. The expiration date was
xed at December 26, 2009.
December 19, 2009 The expiration date was pushed back to February 28, 2010, without
changing the existing tier structure.
March 2, 2010 The expiration date was pushed back to March 31, 2010, without chang-
ing the existing tier structure.
April 15, 2010 The expiration date was pushed back to June 2, 2010, without changing
the existing tier structure.
June 22, 2010 The expiration date was pushed back to November 30, 2010, without
changing the existing tier structure.
December 17, 2010 The expiration date was pushed back to January 3, 2012 without chang-
ing the existing tier structure.
1 Mainly baaed on Fujita (2010a), \The Chronology of the Emergency Unemployment Com-
pensation Program (EUC08)."
ated such a program.3 EUC08 was signed into law in June 2008. Initially, the maximum duration
of extended UI benets under the program was 13 weeks, but it has been extended several times
since then. As of January 2011, the EUC08 and subsequent expansions provided extended ben-
3 Congress enacted temporary extensions of UI benets in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008 so
far. See Whittaker (2008) for more details about past extensions.
5ets for up to 53 weeks. Combining the extensions under EUC08 (53 weeks) with the regular
benets (26 weeks) and the EB (20 weeks), an unemployed worker is entitled to UI benets for
up to 99 weeks in total. See Table 1 for a summary of the original EUC08 and the subsequent
expansions and extensions.
Typically, the additional UI benets under the EB program can be used after an unemployed
worker exhausts all the tiers under the EUC08. Therefore, I refer to the additional benets under
the EB program as Tier-5. Also for ease of notation, I will refer to the regular UI benets as
Tier-0.
Let me make three remarks about the nature of the ongoing extensions implemented in re-
sponse to the current downturn. First, it is very generous compared with the past extensions.
For example, before the current extensions, the most generous ones in the past provided about
60 weeks of benets compared with the current extensions of up to 99 weeks.
Second, the EUC08 was gradually expanded. It is not as if an unemployed workers were
eligible for 99 weeks of UI benets from the rst time the EUC08 was enacted. Instead, as
of June 2008 when the EUC08 was introduced, the available extension was only 13 weeks of
additional UI benets. It took a year and a half since the rst EUC08 was enacted until the
maximum of 99 weeks of additional UI benets became available. In the main experiment of the
paper, I will take into account the gradual nature of the ongoing extensions.
Third, although the number 99 is widely cited to describe the generosity of the ongoing
extensions, not all unemployed workers actually enjoy the full 99 weeks of extended UI benets.
In order to understand how many weeks of extended UI benets an unemployed worker is actually
entitled to, one needs to understand the tier structure and what the expiration date means. For
example, let's consider the extension enacted on June 22, 2010. The extension did not change
the existing tier structure, but it pushed back the expiration date by 23 weeks to November
30, 2010. This means that an unemployed worker cannot move up the tier that he is in as of
November 30, 2010. If he is receiving UI benets under Tier-1 as of November 30, the end of
Tier-1 is the end of the UI benets for him. In other words, except for unemployed workers who
are close to exhausting Tier-0 (the regular UI benets of 26 weeks), the unemployed workers
who were receiving Tier-0 benets as of the implementation of the extension (June 22) can only
go up to Tier-1, as they will never exhaust Tier-1 benets by the expiration date. Those who
just started receiving the regular UI benets actually will not qualify even for Tier-1 under the
extension because they will not exhaust the 26-week regular benet (Tier-0) by the expiration
date, which is 23 weeks ahead of the day of the extensions. Considering the typical distance
between the date when an UI benet extension is enacted and the associated expiration date
(the last ve extensions on average have 20 weeks before the expiration date), and the duration
of each tier (Tiers-0 to 4 have on average 19 weeks), each extension typically allows unemployed
workers to go up just one tier from the one that they are receiving at the time of each extension.
The stylized version of UI benet extensions in the model developed in this paper will capture
this temporary nature of the ongoing extensions.
3 Model
I start by describing the environment and then move on to characterize the worker's and the
rm's problem and the equilibrium. Since I will characterize the worker's and the rm's problem
6recursively, I omit the time script from individual state and choice variables and use a prime to
denote the variable in the next period. At the end of this section, I will dene the competitive
equilibrium and then the steady-state competitive equilibrium. I conduct the analysis based on
comparison of steady states in Section 6, and then move on to the transition analysis in Section 7.
3.1 Preferences
Time is discrete and innite and starts from period 1. The model is inhibited by a mass of
innitely lived workers and rms. Workers maximize expected lifetime utility. Utility is time
separable, with the time discount factor . Period utility depends on consumption of goods, c,







The employment status of a worker is represented by u. Workers can be either employed u = 0
or unemployed u > 0. When a worker is unemployed, u represents the length of the ongoing
unemployment spells: how many periods the worker has been unemployed. An unemployed
worker receives unemployment insurance benets if he is eligible and can search for a job. Denote
s, S, and V as the individual search eort, aggregate search eort of all (unemployed) workers,
and total number of vacancies posted, respectively. There is an aggregate matching function M
that takes S and V and outputs the number of new matches created, M. Specically:
Mt = ft(St;Vt) = tf
m(St;Vt) (2)
where  is the average matching eciency, and t is the loading factor for the matching eciency
in period t. We can also dene the matching probabilities per search eort, fs
t , and per vacancy,
fv













When an unemployed worker searches with an intensity s, the probability of nding a job is fs
t s.
Assuming constant returns to scale matching function, the labor market tightness, `t = Vt
St, is
sucient to determine both fs
t and fv
t without knowing St and Vt themselves. The labor market
tightness is the key equilibrium object.
A matched pair of a worker and a rm produces consumption goods as output. The labor
productivity is characterized by wth, where wt is the market wage rate in period t, and h is the
human capital of the worker, with h 2 fh1;h2;:::;hHg where h1 < h2 < h3 < ::: < hH. Human
capital changes according to a transition probability h
u;h;h0 where u is the employment status.
The transition of h for unemployed workers (u > 0) is intended to capture skill depreciation
during an unemployment spell. The transition of human capital for employed workers (u = 0)
7captures skill acquisition while working. The output is shared between the worker and the rm
in the match. In particular, ! is denoted as the share of the output received by the worker. The
rm gets the share 1   !. Therefore, the wage of a worker is wth(1   !).
Job separation is exogenous and characterized by separation probability t. Separation prob-
ability is the same across all workers, but can be time varying.
3.3 Financial Market
Workers can save and, potentially, borrow to smooth consumption over time. Markets are in-
complete in the sense that workers cannot trade state-contingent securities. Let k denote the
asset holdings of a worker. The interest rate associated with the asset in period t is rt. Workers
are subject to a borrowing constraint k  k.
3.4 Unemployment Insurance Program
The government runs the UI program. The UI program is characterized by fb;q;B(x;y)g, where b
is the amount of UI benets, q is the amount of non-UI benets that are available for unemployed
workers who are either (i) ineligible for UI benets or (ii) eligible but have exhausted UI benets,
and B(x;y) represents how many periods a worker of type y in Tier-x is eligible to receive UI
benets. y represents the eligibility for UI benets. Workers with y = 0 are ineligible and cannot
receive any UI benets. In other words, B(x;0) = 0 for 8x. Workers with y = 1 in Tier-x are
eligible and can receive UI benets until B(x;1) periods. If a worker with the eligibility status
y is unemployed for u(> 0) periods, and the worker is in Tier-x, the worker receives UI benets
if u  B(x;y), and the worker receives q if u > B(x;y). x takes the value between 0 and X.
As will be clear when calibrating the model, x = 0 indicates the regular UI benets, and x > 0
indicates that a worker is eligible for extended UI benets.
Furthermore, for a notational convenience, I dene a function (x;u;y), which species the





0 if u = 0
b if 0 < u  B(x;y)
q if u > B(x;y)
(5)
The eligibility status y does not change during an unemployment spell, i.e., y0 = y if u > 0.
When a worker nds a new job and becomes employed (u = 0), the worker loses the eligibility
for UI benets, i.e., y becomes y = 0 upon nding a job. An employed worker without eligibility
(y = 0) becomes eligible (y0 = 1) with a probability . This is a simple way to capture that
a worker becomes eligible for UI benets after working for a certain period and contributing
suciently to the UI program. Once an employed worker becomes eligible (y = 1), the worker
never loses the eligibility until the worker loses a job and nds a new job. To ease notation, I use
a short-hand notation 
y
y;y0 for the transition probability with respect to y for employed (u = 0)
workers.
3.5 UI Benet Extension
An extension of UI benets basically gives an additional duration of UI benets for the unem-
ployed who are exhausting the existing benets under the current Tier-x. In the model, An
extension of UI benets is modeled as shifting x of unemployed workers, in particular to a higher
8x that is associated with a longer duration of UI benets. Meanwhile, when a worker becomes
employed, it is assumed that x of the worker reverts back to 0 (which means no additional UI
benets once the worker becomes employed). As for workers who are employed at the time of an
extension, I assume that those workers do not benet from extensions, for simplicity. In reality,
some workers who lose their job relatively soon after an extension is implemented could benet
from the extension. However, since there is no separation decision and the separation probability
will be calibrated to be low, not many employed workers benet from an extension. Therefore,
no extension for employed workers at the time of an extension is a reasonable assumption.
Specically, an extension in period t is dened by a function x0 = Et(x;u), which takes the
worker of unemployment duration u and currently eligible for Tier-x into a new Tier-x0. If there
is no extension in period t, Et(x;u) = x. If there is an extension in period t, and for example,
the extension upgrades workers in Tier-0 (no extension) to Tier-1 (rst available extension),
Et(0;u) = 1.
3.6 Worker's Problem
In this section, the problem of a worker is characterized using a recursive formulation. The
individual state of a worker is represented by (x;h;u;y;k). The problem of an employed (u = 0)
worker can be dened recursively as follows:






















0 = (1 + rt)k + wth(1   !) (7)
Equation (6) is the Bellman equation. Equation (7) is the budget constraint. Notice three
things: First, employment status u does not change at u = 0 if the worker remains employed,
but changes to u = 1 (rst period of unemployment) if separation occurs with probability t.
Second, search intensity (s) is zero, i.e., there is no job search or job-to-job transition. Third,
workers do not expect x to change; in other words, all extensions of UI benets are a complete
surprise to workers. In the steady-state equilibrium, x does not change.
Similarly, the problem of an unemployed worker with the unemployment duration of u > 0
can be dened recursively as follows:





























Equation (8) is the Bellman equation. Equation (9) is the budget constraint. Equation (10) is
the constraint for the search intensity decision. s is bounded from above by 1=fs
t to make sure
that the probability of nding a job never exceeds 1. Notice four things: First, if an unemployed
worker chooses a search eort of s, the worker will nd a job with probability fs
t s. Second, the
tier of a worker (x) who nds a new job changes to x0 = 0 (eligible for no extension). Third, y0
becomes 0 if the worker nds a job, while y0 remains y if the worker fails to land a job. Fourth,
it is necessary to know the sequence of labor market tightness f`tg1
t=1 to know the sequence of
the job nding probability.
The Bellman equations (6) and (8) characterize the optimal value functions Wt(x;h;u;y;k)
and associated optimal decision rules k0 = gk
t (x;h;u;y;k) and s = gs
t(x;h;u;y;k).
For notational convenience, let M be the space of an individual state, i.e., (x;h;u;y;k) 2 M.
Let M be the Borel -algebra generated by M, and m the probability measure dened over
M. I will use a probability space (M;M;m) to represent a type distribution of heterogeneous
workers.
3.7 Firm's Problem
Since the per-period prot of a matched rm depends only on period t and the human capital
of the worker h, the value of a matched rm can be recursively dened as follows:4







As for unmatched rms, free entry of rms is assumed; unmatched rms can enter the labor
market by posting a vacancy at the ow vacancy posting cost of . Therefore, the free entry
condition in period t can be denoted as follows:












An unmatched rm pays  to post a vacancy, and with probability fv
t , the vacancy gets matched
and the rm becomes matched in the next period. The value in the next period is discounted
by the interest rate rt. The last fraction in Equation (12) represents the expected value of the
unmatched rm, weighted by the search eort chosen by dierent types of workers. Notice that,
thanks to the constant returns to scale of the aggregate matching function, labor market tightness
`t can be obtained from the free entry condition (12) for period t.
4 The value of a matched rm depends only on the human capital of the worker matched and not on other
elements of the type of the worker because of the assumption that the bargaining outcome is characterized by
a constant !. In general, where the Nash bargaining solution is used, the bargaining solution depends on all
elements of the worker's type, including asset holding. For a more general bargaining setup, see Krusell et al.
(2010) and Nakajima (2010).
103.8 Equilibrium
I will rst dene the competitive equilibrium, then move on to dene the steady-state competitive
equilibrium.
Denition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Given an unemployment insurance policy fb;q;B(x;y)g,
a sequence of time-varying parameters ft;tg1
t=1, prices frt;wtg1
t=1 and extensions fEt(x;u)g1
t=1,
and the initial type distribution of workers m0, a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of la-
bor market tightness f`tg1
t=1,value functions Wt(x;h;u;y;k), Ft(h), optimal decision rules k0 =
gk
t (x;h;u;y;k), and s = gs
t(x;h;u;y;k), and probability measures fmtg1
t=1, such that:
1. Given f`tg1
t=1, Wt(x;h;u;y;k) is a solution to the Bellman equations (6) and (8). k0 =
gk
t (x;h;u;y;k) and s = gs
t(x;h;u;y;k) are the associated optimal decision rules for all
periods.
2. Given f`tg1
t=1, Ft(h) is a solution to the Bellman equation (11) for all periods.
3. Given the initial measure m0, the sequence of measure of workers fmtg1
t=1 is consistent
with the transition function implied by the stochastic processes for h and y; the job turnover
process implied by separation probability ftg1
t=1; job nding probability, which is computed
from labor market tightness f`tg1
t=1 and the match-eciency loading factor ftg1
t=1; optimal
decision rules s = gs
t(x;h;u;y;k) and k0 = gk
t (x;h;u;y;k); and the sequence of extensions
fEt(x;u)g1
t=1.
4. Labor market tightness f`tg1
t=1 is consistent with free entry condition (12) for each period.
Denition 2 (Steady-state competitive equilibrium) A steady-state competitive equilibrium
is a competitive equilibrium where labor market tightness, type distribution, value functions, and
optimal decision rules are time-invariant.
4 Calibration
Table 2 summarizes the calibration of parameter values. Since the main focus of the model is the
labor market status transition, one period is set as one week. Period 1 in the model corresponds
to the last week of 2007, which was about the beginning of the last recession. I rst calibrate the
initial steady state in this section. The initial steady state is the starting point of the transition
analysis and is intended to capture the average state of the U.S. economy, especially shortly
before the recent recession and the associated unemployment benet extension took place. Since
I calibrate the steady-state economy, I will omit the time script from all variables below. I will
discuss the calibration of the baseline transition path in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7.
4.1 Preferences








11Table 2: Summary of Calibration: Initial Steady State
Parameter Value Remark
 0.9885 Time discount factor. Match median liquid asset holding.
 2.0000 Coecient of relative risk aversion.
 94.360 Match average time spent on job search.
 1.7000 Match unemployment duration elasticity.
 1.8633 Match job nding probability.
 1.0000 Normalization (will be changed in the transition analysis).
 0.7200 Estimate of Shimer (2005).
h1 0.8690 Fujita (2011).
h2 1.1500 Fujita (2011).
u;h;h0 { See Section 4.2. From Fujita (2011).
 0.0028 Average separation rate.
! 0.9700 Worker's share of surplus.
 13076 Match the unemployment rate of 4.77 percent.
k 0.0000 No borrowing allowed.
b 0.4350 Replacement rate of UI benets. From Gruber (1998).
q 49.700 Average weekly benets under the Food Stamp Program.
 0.0050 Match proportion of unemployed receiving UI benets.
r 0.0006 From Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). Annual interest rate of 3 percent.
w 736.00 Average weekly earnings.
The separability between utility from consumption and (dis-)utility from search intensity is also
employed by Chetty (2008).  is calibrated to be 2, which is the widely accepted value in the
literature.  is calibrated such that, on average, s, the time spent on job search is 3 percent of
disposable time. This calibration procedure yields  = 94:36.  is the most important parameter
because  is the key determinant of how search eort responds to a change in benets of nding
a job and benets of remaining unemployed. I calibrate  to be 1:7. With the calibrated value
of  = 1:7, the responses of the average duration of unemployment to changes in policy implied
by the model are within the range of available estimates from empirical analysis. I will discuss
more on this issue in Section 6. Considering the importance of  in driving the main results of
the paper, I will investigate the sensitivity of the main results under a dierent value of  in
Section 7.3. The discount factor, , is calibrated such that the median worker has a liquid asset
of 2600 dollars. This number is computed by Chetty (2008).5 As a result,  is calibrated to be
0:9885.
5 See Table 1. The median gross liquid wealth of workers in the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) sample is 1763 dollars in 1990 dollars. Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), it is converted into 2600
dollars in 2005.
124.2 Labor Market
The aggregate matching function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, which is widely accepted in the
literature.
M = ft(S;V ) = tS
V
1  (14)
The average matching eciency, , is calibrated such that the job nding probability in the model
is comparable to data. During 2005-2007, the average weekly job-nding probability is 0.0559
according to Current Population Survey (CPS). The process yields  = 1:8633. The loading
factor to the matching eciency  is normalized to one in the steady state. The curvature
parameter of the matching function  is calibrated to be 0.72, which is the estimate of Shimer
(2005). I will investigate the sensitivity of the main results with respect to a dierent value
of  in Section 7.3 for the following two reasons. First, there is wide range of estimates of .
According to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), estimates of  that are obtained using variety
of methods and data range between 0.12 and 0.81.6 Second,  is estimated for a model without
search intensity decision.
The calibration of the parameters associated with human capital is based on Fujita (2011).
Using Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 1996 and 2001 panels, he computed
that the average earnings loss after an unemployment spell of 1-2 months, 2-5 months, and more
than 6 months is 0.023, 0.021, 0.142, respectively. In other words, the earnings loss associated
with long-term unemployment is substantial (as large as 14 percent), although the computed
overall average earnings loss (0.043) masks such substantial decline.7 Based on his empirical
ndings, he calibrates a model with human capital depreciation while the worker is unemployed
using two levels of human capital. I use his calibration and set H = 2, h1 = 0:869, and
h2 = 1:150. In terms of the transition probabilities, I follow Fujita (2011) and set u=0;2;2 = 1:0
(no skill depreciation during employment), u=0;1;2 = 0:004 (low-skilled workers become highly
skilled on average after ve years of unemployment), u>0;1;1 = 1:0 (no skill accumulation during
unemployment), and u>0;2;1 = 0:0975 (monthly skill loss probability of 0.39).
The weekly separation rate, , is set at 0.0028. According to the CPS, this is the average
weekly transition probability from employment to unemployment during 2005-2007. Together
with the job-nding rate of 0.0559, the implied steady-state unemployment rate is 4.77 percent.
This is lower than the post-war average (5.67 percent), but very close to the level just at the end
of 2007, when the last recession started.
The parameter pertaining to the share of surplus, !, is set at 97 percent. The number
corresponds to the large size of the earnings of workers relative to the rm's prots and is used
by Shimer (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and Nakajima (2010).
I normalize the ratio of vacancies to the aggregate search eort, which is called the labor
market tightness, to be one in the steady state. The cost of posting a vacancy, , is calibrated
such that this is the case in the steady-state equilibrium. The procedure yields  = 13076 dollars.
6 See Table 3 of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
7 Alba-Ramirez and Freeman (1990) calculate that a year of joblessness reduced the earnings of workers by about
3 percent, using data of Spanish workers (ECVT) in 1985.
134.3 Financial Market
The borrowing limit k is set at zero, i.e., no borrowing is allowed. This is the same assumption
as in Acemoglu and Shimer (2000).
4.4 Unemployment Insurance Program
In calibrating the level of UI benets, I use a replacement ratio b. The level of UI benets, b,
is set such that b is the fraction b of the average labor income in the steady state. b is set at
0.435, which is the mean replacement ratio across states, computed by Gruber (1998).8
In pinning down the amount of non-UI benets, q, I use the average benets under the
Food Stamp Program (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). According to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (2008), average monthly benet per person under
the Food Stamp Program was 92:6 dollars in 2005, and the average number of family members
was 2:3. Therefore, the average weekly benet per family in 2005 was 49:7 dollars. This is the
calibrated value of q.
In the initial steady state, there is no UI benet extension. Therefore, x = 0 for all workers.
B(x = 0;1) is set at 26 weeks, which is the duration of regular UI benets for a majority of
states.
The probability of an ineligible employed worker becoming eligible for UI benets, , is cal-
ibrated to match the average proportion of unemployed workers who are receiving UI benets.
Those receiving UI benets are those who are eligible for UI benets and have not exhausted
the benets yet. Historically, the proportion of unemployed workers receiving UI benets uc-
tuates substantially, between 30 percent to 45 percent, and it is strongly countercyclical. The
cyclicality is due to the cyclicality of the proportion of rings, which itself is countercyclical, and
the extensions of UI benets, which are made available during severe recessions. In the recent
downturn, the proportion of recipients of UI benets among all unemployed workers increases
dramatically, from around 36 percent in 2005-2007 to 66 percent in 2008-2009, with the highest
at about 70 percent. The question of which number should be used as a calibration target is
crucially important for the main exercise of the paper because the proportion directly determines
how many workers are aected by changes in duration and level of UI benets. Since I am in-
terested in measuring the eect of UI benet extensions on the unemployment rate during the
ongoing downturn, and there is no endogenous mechanism in the model to generate the increase
in the proportion of UI eligible unemployment during downturns except for due to extensions,
I use 55 percent as the calibration target in the initial steady state. With 55 percent as the
calibration target in the initial steady state, approximately 70 percent of unemployed workers
receive UI benets when the proportion is at its highest along the baseline transition path.9
Once I choose the target for the proportion of UI benet recipients, I pin down  such that the
proportion of unemployed workers receiving UI benets in the initial steady state is 55 percent.
The calibration strategy generates  = 0:0050 at a weekly frequency.
8 See Table A1 of Gruber (1998). I take a simple average of the replacement ratios across all states. The median
ratio is 0.422.
9 This is not an easy calibration because I need to implement the transition analysis with a dierent target for
the proportion of UI benet recipients in the initial steady state.
14Table 3: Tiers of Unemployment Insurance Benets in the
Model1
Tier Tier-0 Tier-1 Tier-2 Tier-3 Tier-4 Tier-5
Weeks 26 20 14 13 13 13
Cumulative weeks 26 46 60 73 86 99
1 Tier-0 corresponds to the regular UI benets. Tiers-1 to 4 corre-
spond to Tiers-1 to 4 of the EUC08. Tier-5 corresponds to the
extended benets under the EB program.
Table 4: Extensions of Unemployment Insurance Benets in
the Model
No Period Year/Month/Week Description
1 27 2008/June/5th Tier-1 is introduced.
2 48 2008/Nov/4th Tier-2 is introduced.
3 60 2009/Feb/3rd Tier-3 is introduced.
4 74 2009/May/4th Tier-4 is introduced.
5 98 2009/Nov/2nd Tier-5 is introduced.
6 112 2010/Feb/3rd Tiers 1-5 UI benets extended.
7 126 2010/May/4th Tiers 1-5 UI benets extended.
8 140 2010/Aug/5th Tiers 1-5 UI benets extended.
9 154 2010/Dec/1st Tiers 1-5 UI benets extended.
4.5 Prices
The weekly interest rate is set at r = 0:0006, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 3
percent. The value is used by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). The wage rate is set at w = 736,
which is the median weekly earnings of all workers in 2005 dollars, according to the CPS.
4.6 UI Benet Extensions
I model the ongoing extensions of UI benets, which are described in detail in Section 2, in
a stylized fashion. Specically, I assume ve tiers of extended UI benets, in addition to the
regular UI benets (which is labeled Tier-0). Table 3 summarizes the tiers. Tier-0 (regular UI)
is available for all workers and provides up to 26 weeks of benets. This is the only tier available
in the initial steady state. Tiers 1 to 4 correspond to Tiers 1 to 4 of the EUC08. Tier 5 in
the model corresponds to the EB program, which was made available to most states during the
recent downturn and can be used when an unemployed worker exhausts all the benets under
the EUC08. In total, a worker who is eligible for up to Tier 5 benets can receive 99 weeks of UI
benets, like currently unemployed workers in the U.S. economy. I average the length of Tier-4
and Tier-5 in the model, which makes the duration of Tiers 3-5 to be 13 weeks each.
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Figure 2: Job nding Rate.
EUC08 and its subsequent expansions and extensions in a stylized manner. Table 4 summarizes
the UI benet extensions in the model. There are nine extensions in the model in total, like in the
U.S. economy so far. Each of the rst ve extensions introduces an additional tier, one by one.
For example, when Tier-2 is introduced in period 48, all the workers who are eligible for (and
most likely receiving) Tier-1 benets become eligible for Tier-2 benets as well. Workers who are
eligible only for Tier-0 (regular) benets become eligible for Tier-1 benets. Employed workers
do not become eligible for any additional benets; when they become unemployed, they are
eligible only for the Tier-0 (regular) benets. Similar things take place until the fth extension.
The dates of the rst ve extensions roughly correspond to the dates of the original EUC08, its
expansions, and the dates when the two levels of the EBs are activated.
The remaining four extensions extend only the existing additional UI benets. These cor-
respond to the last four extensions in the U.S., which also extend the existing additional UI
benets without adding new tiers. Although the length of intervals between each extension in
the U.S. economy was not similar, I assume that all extensions in the model take place with the
uniform interval of 24 weeks. The last extension in the model, which took place in December
2010, corresponds to the most recent extension implemented in December 2010.
4.7 Transition Path
In the transition analysis, I focus on the changes in the separation rate, t and the loading
factor for the matching eciency, t, and leave the interest rate, rt, and wage rate, wt, constant
at the initial steady-state level over time. The time-varying separation rate is calibrated using
the actual separation rate computed using the CPS. Figure 1 compares the transition rate from
employment to unemployment (separation rate) during 2007 to 2009, and the smoothed version
which is used as a model input. We can see that the separation rate increased sharply from
the end of 2007 to the end of 2008 and that it remained high since the end of 2008. The input
used for the model captures the trend during 2007-2008. Moreover, in the model, the separation
probability is assumed to gradually come down to the steady-state level by the end of 2011 and
remain at the level after that.
16The transition rate from unemployment to employment (job-nding rate) during 2007 to
2009, calculated from the CPS, is shown in Figure 2. The job-nding probability also dropped
sharply from early 2008 to early 2009 and remained at a low level since then. However, there
is no straightforward conversion between the job-nding probability to the loading factor for
the matching eciency, which is the input for the model, because the job-nding probability is
determined not only by the matching eciency, but the search eort and the number of vacancies
posted, both of which are endogenously determined. In order to create the loading factor that is
used as an input for the transition analysis, I assume that the level of the loading factor drops
from early 2008 till early 2009 from the steady-state level of 1, remains at the low level until
the end of 2009, and gradually recovers back to the steady-state level until the end of 2011,
and then remaining at the steady-state level after that. The low level of the loading factor
is calibrated such that, in the baseline transition analysis, the unemployment rate goes up to
around 10 percent in late 2009, which is the highest level observed during the recent downturn so
far. In the baseline transition analysis, it turns out that, with a 16.5 percent drop in the loading
factor (from 1.00 to 0.835), the model can generate a rise in the unemployment rate as large as
observed in the data.
5 Computation
The model does not have an analytical solution and thus is solved numerically.10 I rst briey
describe the solution method of the steady-state equilibrium and then describe the solution
method for transition analysis.
Given a guess of steady-state labor market tightness `0, an individual worker's problem is
solved using value function iteration; I keep iterating the value function using the Bellman
equations until the distance between the guessed and the updated value functions is smaller than
a predetermined tolerance criteria. In terms of the continuous state k, I discretize the space of k.
Once convergence of the value function iteration is achieved, I use the associated optimal decision
rules to simulate the model. I simulate the model forward until a stationary type distribution of
workers is obtained; the type distribution of workers ceases to change between one period to the
next. Once a stationary type distribution is obtained, I can compute the labor market tightness
`1 implied by the free entry condition (12). If the distance between `0 and `1 is smaller than a
predetermined criteria, a steady-state equilibrium is obtained. Otherwise, update the guess of
labor market tightness and start over with a new guess `0.
Equilibrium of a heterogeneous-agent model with a deterministic transition has been solved.11
The innovation of the current paper is that there are multiple policy changes along the determin-
istic transition path, while, to the best of my knowledge, all existing models assume one policy
change in the initial period. Indeed, in the transition analysis of this paper, there are nine policy
changes (extensions of UI benets) assumed in addition to the changes in time-varying param-
eters in the initial period. This adds complication in solving the equilibrium of the model. For
simplicity, let me describe the case in which (1) in period 1, the path of time-varying parameters
ft;tg1
t=1 is revealed, and (2) in period 27, the rst extension is implemented. The solution
10 More details about the computation of heterogeneous-agent models in the steady-state equilibrium, as well as
those with equilibrium transition, can be found in R os-Rull (1999).
11 For example, see Conesa and Krueger (1999).
17method of the model with more than one policy change is a straightforward extension of the
method described below.
First, an equilibrium with deterministic transition with only the change in time-varying pa-
rameters in period 1 is solved. This is a standard problem. Value function is solved backward,
assuming that, in period T, the time-varying parameters go back to their steady-state values and
that the economy goes back to the initial steady state. T has to be large enough to guarantee
that the simulated economy reverts back to the state that is close to the steady state in period
T. Specically, the equilibrium is solved as follows. Guess the path of labor market tightness
f`0
tgT
t=1. With the guess, the sequence of time-varying parameters, and the value function in
period T +1 (which is assumed to be the steady-state values), a worker's problem can be solved
backward, starting from period T and going all the way back to period 1. Optimal decision rules
are obtained as well. Firm's value can be obtained similarly, using backward induction. Now
the type distribution is simulated forward. The initial type distribution is assumed to be the
one pertaining to the steady state. The distribution can be simulated forward using the optimal
decision rules. Once the simulation is done, I can use the free entry condition for each period to
obtain the updated guess of labor market tightness f`1
tgT
t=1. If the distance between the old and
the new guesses is smaller than a predetermined tolerance level, an equilibrium associated with
the rst extension is obtained. Otherwise, the guess is updated, and I must start over.
In the existing models with only one time change in time-varying parameters, this is the end
of the story. But there is a policy change in period 27 here. How do we deal with it? Notice
that the simulation results from period 1 to period 27 are not aected by the policy change in
period 27, since I assume that the policy change is unexpected by the agents. Therefore, in
this step, we can use the type distribution in period 27 obtained in the previous step as the
initial distribution, but notice that, due to the extension of UI benets, some workers shift their
type, specically their Tier-x. So the adjustment of the type distribution in period 27 obtained
in the previous step that is consistent with the UI benet extension is needed. After the type
distribution is adjusted, I can proceed as I did in the rst step. Guess a sequence of labor market
tightness between period 27 and T, f`0
tgT
t=27. Again assuming that the economy converges back
to the steady state in period T, we can use backward induction to solve the value functions of
workers and rms, and obtain optimal decision rules for each period. Notice that the eect of
the extension gradually dies out as workers who nd a job after the extension is implemented no
longer benet from the extension. Also notice that, in this step, we solve only up to period 27
(when the policy change is revealed). Once the economy is simulated from period 27 to period
T, we can obtain an updated guess of the sequence of labor market tightness f`1
tgT
t=27. We keep
iteration over the sequence of labor market tightness until a convergence is obtained.
The actual simulated transition path, which will be shown in Section 7, is a combination of
what is obtained under the rst regime (during period 1-26) and under the second regime (during
period 27 to T). Notice that, even though the transition path of period 27 to T under the rst
regime is not a part of the nal output, it must be solved because workers and rms make their
decision assuming that the labor market tightness of period 27 to T under the rst regime is
realized in the future, when they make their decisions between period 1 and 26.
18Table 5: Eect of Changes in Unemployment Insurance Policy
Economy Initial +10% +20 weeks +73 weeks +1 weeks
Replacement rate 0.4350 0.5350 0.4350 0.4350 0.4350
Duration of UI benets (weeks) 26 26 46 99 1
Unemployment rate (U) 0.0477 0.0489 0.0531 0.0650 0.0708
UI-eligible 0.0327 0.0340 0.0383 0.0505 0.0563
Receiving benets 0.0262 0.0269 0.0357 0.0500 0.0563
(% of U) 55.00 54.89 67.27 76.90 79.57
Exhausted benets 0.0064 0.0071 0.0026 0.0005 {
UI-ineligible 0.0150 0.0150 0.0148 0.0145 0.0145
Median duration (all, weeks) 12.00 12.00 13.00 17.00 20.00
Mean duration (all, weeks) 15.59 15.96 17.62 24.07 28.89
Mean duration (UI-eligible) 16.30 16.81 19.03 27.00 32.73
Mean duration (UI-ineligible) 14.07 14.03 13.97 13.92 13.92
Aggregate search eort (S) 1.4310 1.4295 1.4239 1.4072 1.3987
Average search eort (s) 0.0300 0.0292 0.0268 0.0216 0.0198
Vacancies (V) 1.4310 1.4284 1.4202 1.3994 1.3904
Market tightness (V/S) 1.0000 0.9993 0.9974 0.9945 0.9941
Market tightness (V/U) 1.0000 0.9733 0.8915 0.7176 0.6550
Job-nding rate 0.0559 0.0544 0.0499 0.0403 0.0368
Separation rate 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028
Mean asset (2005 dollar) 2672 2120 1905 1834 1819
Median asset (2005 dollar) 2600 1100 700 700 700
Mean income (2005 dollar) 753 754 750 744 741
Mean labor income (2005 dollar) 779 779 778 776 776
UI benets (2005 dollar) 320 394 320 320 320
Non-UI benets (2005 dollar) 50 50 50 50 50
Proportion of low skilled 0.3443 0.3467 0.3538 0.3682 0.3729
Proportion of high skilled 0.6557 0.6533 0.6462 0.6318 0.6271
6 Results: Steady State
6.1 Properties of the Initial Steady State
In this section, I rst describe the properties of the initial steady-state economy and then inves-
tigate the eect of changes in the unemployment insurance policy using steady-state comparison.
Table 5 summarizes the results. Let us start from the rst column, which shows the properties





















Figure 3: Distribution of Unemployment Duration.
about the average during 2005-2007. Among the unemployed workers, 3.3 percent are eligible to
receive regular UI benets (up to 26 weeks), and 1.5 percent are ineligible. Among the eligible
unemployed workers, 2.6 percent are receiving the UI benets, and 0.6 percent have already
exhausted the benets, meaning that they are unemployed for longer than 26 weeks. The pro-
portion of unemployed workers receiving UI benets over total number of unemployed workers
is 55 percent. The median and mean unemployment duration of all unemployed workers is 12
weeks and 15.6 weeks, respectively. In the initial steady state, two denitions of labor market
tightness (V=S and V=U) are normalized to 1, and the average search eort is calibrated to be
0.03. The weekly job-nding and separation rates are calibrated to be 5.59 percent and 0.28
percent, respectively. The median asset holding is calibrated to be 2600 dollars. The mean asset
holding turns out to be 2672 dollars. The mean labor income of employed workers is 779 dollars,
while an unemployed worker receives 320 dollars if he is receiving UI benets and 50 dollars if
he is either ineligible for UI benets or the benets have been exhausted. 34 percent of workers
are low skilled.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of unemployment duration in the initial steady-state economy.
Panel (a) also shows the distribution of UI-eligible workers. The number of UI eligible unemployed
workers declines more slowly than the total number of unemployed workers because unemployed
workers who are not eligible for UI benets search more intensely and exit from unemployment
relatively faster. Panel (b) shows the distribution of low-skilled unemployed workers. The to-
tal number of unemployed workers declines faster than the number of low-skilled unemployed
workers. Indeed, the number of low-skilled unemployed workers increases at a relatively shorter
duration of unemployment. This is partly because high-skilled unemployed workers search more
intensely to exit unemployment before their skills depreciate and partly because unemployed
workers experience skill depreciation and become low-skilled.
Figure 4 shows the weekly hazard rates (exit probability from unemployment conditional on









 1  11  21  31  41
Unemployment duration (weeks)
Hazard rate (base, low-skilled, UI-eligible)
Hazard rate (base, low-skilled, UI-ineligible)
Hazard rate (base, high-skilled, UI-eligible)
Hazard rate (base, high-skilled, UI-ineligible)









 1  11  21  31  41
Unemployment duration (weeks)
Hazard rate (base, low-skilled, median asset)
Hazard rate (base, low-skilled, zero asset)
(b) Asset holding
Figure 4: Weekly Hazard Rates.
for high-skilled and low-skilled unemployed workers with median asset holding. Since high-
skilled workers lose more by remaining unemployed, they search with more intensity and exit
unemployment with a higher probability. The two straight horizontal lines show the hazard
rates of unemployed workers who are not eligible for UI benets. Since they do not exhaust UI
benets and, therefore, keep receiving the non-UI benets permanently, their search eort does
not change regardless of how long they are unemployed, conditional on asset holding level. When
UI-eligible workers exhaust UI benets, their search eort, and thus the hazard rates, will be the
same as those of ineligible unemployed workers. Panel (b) exhibits how hazard rates are aected
by asset holding. When there is a borrowing constraint, unemployed workers are more desperate
in searching if they are close to the constraint, and thus their consumption is constrained by
it. Chetty (2008) emphasizes the eect by distinguishing from the standard moral hazard eect.
In panel (b), the line below is the hazard rate for low-skilled UI eligible unemployed workers
with median asset holdings (same as in panel (a)), and the line above is for the same type of
unemployed workers with zero asset holdings. Since the borrowing constraint is set at zero,
their consumption is constrained by the current income. As you can see in panel (b), the search
intensity, and thus the hazard rate, are higher when asset holding is lower. Combining panels (a)
and (b), the overall hazard rates go up with unemployment duration partly because unemployed
workers become more desperate as they approach the maximum duration of UI benets and
partly because they exhaust their assets, which make them more desperate.
6.2 Policy Experiments: Changes in UI Benet Policy
The second column of Table 5 shows the eect of increasing the replacement rate of unemployment
insurance benets by 10 percentage points. I use 10 percentage points because various empirical
estimates are available for the response of the average unemployment duration to a 10 percentage
point increase in the replacement rate. In 2005 dollars, the unemployment insurance benet
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Figure 5: Experiment: Replacement Rate Raised by 10 Percentage Points.
replacement rate. The duration of UI benets is xed at 26 weeks. Most important, the mean
duration of unemployment among UI-eligible unemployed workers increases by about 0.5 week,
from 16.3 to 16.8 weeks. The response of the average duration is at the lower bound of the
range of empirical estimates of 0.5-1.5 weeks, which I discussed in Section 1. Since the model is
calibrated to generate the lower bound of the range of the estimated response, the calibration can
be considered as conservative. The longer unemployment duration is caused by a disincentive
eect; more generous UI benets discourage the search eorts of workers who are eligible for UI
benets. Since UI-ineligible workers are not directly aected by the policy change, the increase
in the average duration of all unemployed workers is smaller (+0:4 weeks) than for the UI-
eligible workers (+0:5 weeks). The unemployment rate increases from the baseline rate of 4.77
percent to 4.89 percent. While the average search eort declines ( 2:7 percent), the number
of unemployed workers increases (+2:5 percent), resulting in a slight decline in the aggregate
search eort ( 0:1 percent). Since the decline in the aggregate search eort is relatively small,
the decline in vacancies is also relatively small at  0:2 percent. As a result, true labor market
tightness (V=S) declines by  0:1 percent. It is worth noting that measured labor market tightness
(V=U) drops more than the drop in V=S ( 2:7 percent) because the measure labor market
tightness does not take into account the declining search eort. More generous UI benets
also discourage precautionary savings. The average asset holding drops from 2672 dollars to
2120 dollars. Although I do not consider the general equilibrium eect from declining aggregate
saving, this could have a negative eect on output, in addition to the one caused by a lower
employment rate.
Figure 5 shows how hazard rates and unemployment duration distribution change by increasing
the replacement rate by 10 percentage points. Interestingly, the changes in hazard rates are not
monotonic; hazard rates for both low-skilled and high-skilled unemployed workers shift down for
relatively short unemployment durations, but both shift up for longer unemployment durations.
Because of the more generous level of UI benets, when the benets are exhausted, the loss is
22larger. Remember that the non-UI benets are held constant. Because of the non-monotonic
response of the hazard rates, unemployment duration distribution does not change substantially
by increasing the replacement by 10 percentage points.
The third to fth columns show the eect of increased duration of UI benets, by 20, 73, and
innite weeks, respectively. The 20-week increase is chosen because various empirical estimates
are available for the response of the average duration to a 20-week increase in benet duration.
The 73-week increase is chosen because the addition of 73 weeks makes the total duration 99
weeks, which is the longest duration available in the current U.S. economy, and how the economy
is aected by the currently implemented extensions is the main question of the current paper.
This experiment is also intended to show that a steady-state analysis can be misleading because
the extensions that are currently in place are very dierent from the steady state where all
workers expect 99 weeks of UI benets when they become unemployed, although the potential
maximum duration of UI benets is currently 99 weeks. The last column is associated with an
economy with permanent UI benets.
Let us start from the 20-week increase. The average duration of unemployment among UI-
eligible unemployed workers increases by about 2:7 weeks, from 16.3 to 19.0 weeks. This means
that a one-week increase of UI benet duration is associated with an increase of the average
UI-insured duration by 0.135 weeks. The response of the average duration is approximately in
the middle of the range of empirical estimates of 0.1-0.2, which I discussed in Section 1. The
overall average of unemployment duration increases by 2:0 weeks. The unemployment rate goes
up to 5.3 percent (0.5 percentage point increase). As discussed in the paragraph above, the
true labor market tightness (V=S) declines ( 0:3 percent) less than the observed labor market
tightness (V=U) ( 10:9 percent) because the observed labor market tightness does not account
for the reduced search eort ( 10:7 percent). The job-nding rate declines from 5:6 percent
per week to 5:0 percent. Mean asset holding declines from 2672 dollars to 1905 dollars, as the
precautionary saving motive is weakened by the longer availability of UI benets. A longer
duration of unemployment shifts the composition of skilled and unskilled workers; as the more
generous UI benet duration discourages the search eort and induces unemployed workers to
remain unemployed longer, more workers lose their skills during unemployment spells. As a
result, the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy drops from 66 percent in the initial
steady state to 65 percent, which lowers the average wage of workers from 779 dollars to 778
dollars.
Figure 6 shows how hazard rates and unemployment duration distribution change by increasing
the duration of UI benets by 20 weeks. As in the case of an increased replacement rate, the
changes in the hazard rates are not monotonic. The hazard rates are lower in an economy with
longer duration of UI benets for most part of unemployment durations. However, as unemployed
workers are getting closer and closer to exhausting UI benets, the hazard rates rise more than in
the initial steady state. The unemployment duration distribution shifts up noticeably, reecting
the strong moral hazard eect induced by a longer duration of UI benets.
When the UI benet duration is further increased to 99 weeks, and then innite weeks, the
eect observed in the 20-week extension is further strengthened. When the UI benets are avail-
able for 99 weeks, the mean duration of unemployment among all unemployed workers becomes
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Figure 6: Experiment: Duration of UI Benets Increased by 20 Weeks.
increase in the UI benet duration from 26 to 99 weeks increases the unemployment rate by 1.7
percentage points, from 4.8 percent to 6.5 percent. However, as I will show in the next section,
this is misleading as the eect of the current UI extensions on the unemployment rate, because
of its gradual and temporary nature of the ongoing extensions of UI benets. The dierence
between the changes in the true labor market tightness ( 0:6 percent) and observed labor mar-
ket tightness ( 28:2 percent) widens further as the average search eort drops further ( 28:0
percent). In the limit case in which UI benets are available permanently, the average duration
of unemployment becomes 28:9 weeks, and the unemployment rate soars to 7:1 percent.
7 Results: Transition
7.1 Baseline Scenario
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the baseline equilibrium transition path generated by the model.
Figure 7 covers labor market variables, while Figure 8 covers income, consumption, and asset
holding. The gures cover the period between December 2007 and December 2012. As discussed
in Section 4.7, the actual data on separation rates up until late 2010 are used as inputs. The path
of the loading factor to matching eciency up until late 2010 is calibrated so that the path of the
unemployment rate generated by the model replicates the observed path of the unemployment
rate so far. After late 2010, both the separation rates and the loading factor are assumed to
gradually go back to their steady-state levels by the end of 2011 and then remain at their steady-
state levels. In terms of information, in the last week of December 2007, when the economy
is assumed to be in a steady state, the entire path of time-varying parameters ft;tg1
t=1 is
revealed to all agents. In other words, it is a perfect foresight equilibrium in terms of time-
varying parameters. Besides, each of the policy changes (there are nine UI benet extensions
in the baseline transition path) are a complete surprise to the agents. Between June 2008 and
December 2010, a total of nine UI benet extensions are implemented. One can see them as
24the sudden changes in some of the panels in Figure 7. In December 2012 (the last period in the
panels), the economy is still on its gradual way back to the steady state.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 compares the unemployment rate in the data and the one generated
by the model. They are close to each other; both increase sharply between the end of 2007 to
2009 and remain high at slightly below 10 percent since then. The closeness is not a result;
the loading factor of the matching eciency is calibrated to achieve it. As there are no more
UI benet extensions, and both the loading factor and separation rate are assumed to gradu-
ally revert back to their respective steady-state levels, the unemployment rate in the model is
predicted to gradually go back to its steady-state level of 4.77 percent. Panel (b) shows the
aggregate and the average search eort. The average search eort drops sharply every time a
new extension is executed. The average search eort also remains low between 2008 and 2010,
due to congestion (high number of unemployed) and a low search eciency (the loading factor
remains low). On the other hand, the aggregate search eort stays higher than the steady-state
level, since the number of unemployed workers is substantially higher than the initial steady-state
level during the transition. This naturally causes a high level of vacancy postings during the
transition (panel (c)). The model does not do a good job in this dimension thus far, since the
observed vacancy posting remained low during the period in the data. One possible explanation
is that the model does not capture the shock to the aggregate demand; a negative demand shock
might prevent rms from increasing the number of vacancies even though the number of workers
searching for a job increased substantially during the downturn. However, the main result of
the paper, which is the eect of UI benet extensions on the unemployment rate is probably
not substantially aected, since what is important is how the number of vacancies declines in
response to a lower aggregate search eort induced by the UI benet extensions. An alternative
approach is to x the job-nding rate per search eort and not to allow the job-nding rate to
respond to the UI benet extensions. Since the job-nding rate does change under this alterna-
tive approach, the contribution of the UI benet extensions to the unemployment rate would be
smaller.
Panel (d) compares the two denitions of labor market tightness. The rst is the true labor
market tightness, which is the ratio between the number of vacancies and the aggregate search
eort (V=S). The other is the observed labor market tightness, which is dened as the ratio
between the number of vacancies and the unemployment rate. The latter does not take into
account the changes in search eort, which are not observed. Both drop at the beginning of
the transition path from the steady-state level of 1, as the higher separation rate in the future,
which reduces the value of a match, is revealed. At the end of the transition, both are on their
way to go back to their respective steady-state levels. The dierence arises when the search
eort is discouraged by a series of extensions. Each of the nine extensions gives disincentive
to the search eort and brings the true labor market tightness down, while the observed labor
market tightness is little aected. The diversion between the two denitions of the labor market
tightness implies that the changing search eciency could account for at least a part of the recent
movement of the Beveridge curve; the declining search eort appears as the rightward shift of the
Beveridge curve if the search eort is not taken into account. Panel (e) exhibits the separation
and job-nding rates during the transition. The separation rate is exogenously set and calibrated
from the data. The job-nding probability tracks the pattern of the loading factor of the search
25eciency (Figure 2), but declines more than the loading factor as the aggregate search eort
drops when UI benet extensions discourage workers to search intensely. Finally, panel (f) shows
the mean duration of unemployment in both the model and the data. In the model, as extensions
are in eect and the matching eciency declines, the search eort is discouraged, and the mean
duration continues to increase. The eect is stronger for UI-eligible unemployed workers because
unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI benets are not aected by extensions. Since about
70 percent of the unemployed workers are receiving UI benets during the simulated downturn,
the rise in the mean unemployment duration among UI-eligible workers mainly characterizes
the mean unemployment duration of all unemployed workers. Compared with the data, the
model successfully generates the hump in the mean unemployment duration, but the magnitude
is weaker than in data; the mean unemployment duration reached 35 weeks in the data, while
the highest duration that the model generates is 27 weeks.
Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows the path of the average consumption. Consumption drops precip-
itately in the rst period when the transition path of the time-varying parameters is revealed.
More specically, since it is revealed that the separation rate and matching eciency will drop
and stay low for awhile, consumption adjusts downward to the revised expected lifetime in-
come. However, when the series of extensions start being implemented from mid-2008, average
consumption is adjusted upward, as unemployed workers expect to receive higher benets (UI
benets instead of non-UI benets) during most of an unemployment spell. Panel (b) shows the
path of the mean asset holding. The mean asset holding keeps rising after the path of time-
varying parameters is revealed. The mean asset holding increases from 2672 dollars to 5148
dollars during 2008-2009 and then reverts back to the initial steady-state level gradually after
2009. It is an optimal response of precautionary savings to a higher risk of separation and a
longer unemployment spell. It is interesting to note that the saving rate has remained high in
the U.S. economy since the recent downturn started. Increased savings are often attributed to
the deleveraging from the state of excess borrowing, but this increase can also be rationalized as
the increased precautionary savings in response to a higher labor market risk. Panel (c) exhibits
the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy. As the unemployment duration becomes
longer (see Figure 7, panel (f)), more workers experience skill depreciation. As a result, the pro-
portion of high-skilled workers declines from the steady-state level of 66 percent to 58 percent in
2011 and slowly recovers after that. The average labor income (panel (d)) reects the transition
of the proportion of skilled workers. The average weekly labor income slowly declines from its
steady-state level of 779 dollars to 765 dollars, and slowly goes back to the steady-state level.
In order to decompose the eect of UI benet extensions, the time-varying separation rate,
and the time-varying loading factor to the matching eciency, which aects the job nding rate, I
run a variety of counterfactual experiments. Figure 9 summarizes the results from counterfactual
experiments. Panel (a) shows (i) the unemployment rate in the data, (ii) the unemployment
rate under the baseline transition path (which is calibrated to replicate the data), (iii) the
counterfactual path without UI benet extensions, and (iv) the counterfactual path without UI
benet extensions and changes in the loading factor. The comparison between (ii) and (iii) tells
the contribution of the UI benet extensions. The comparison between (iii) and (iv) implies the
contribution of the time-varying loading factor, and the deviation of (iv) from the steady-state
level of the unemployment rate (4.77 percent) implies the eect of the time-varying separation
26rate. Panel (b) shows these dierences; Panel (b) shows the contribution to the unemployment
rate from the UI benet extensions, the changes in the separation rate, and the changes in
the matching eciency and the resulting job-nding rate. I look at the average contribution
between September 2008, when the unemployment rate in the data reached 9.7 percent, and
December 2010, when the unemployment rate remained high and the latest data was available.
The unemployment rate in the baseline transition analysis during the period is 9.87 percent,
which is close to the average unemployment rate in the data (9.7 percent). Compared with the
initial level of the unemployment rate (4.77 percent), the size of the increase is 5.10 percent. In the
alternative experiment without the UI benet extensions, the average unemployment rate during
the same period is 8.63 percent, implying that the contribution from the UI benets extensions is
1.23 percentage points. This is about 24 percent of the total increase in the unemployment rate.
In the economy without the UI benet extensions but with the time-varying loading factor to the
matching eciency (the average unemployment rate of 8.63 percent), and the economy without
either (7.20 percent), the dierence in the average unemployment rate is 1.43 percentage points.
This is the implied contribution from the time-varying matching eciency, or the job-nding
rate. Compared with the size of the overall change in the unemployment rate, the contribution
is 28 percent. The dierence between the average unemployment rate of the economy with
the time-varying separation rate (7.20 percent) and the steady-state unemployment rate (4.77
percent) is the contribution from the higher separation rate. The magnitude is 2.43 percentage
points, or 48 percent of the overall change in the unemployment rate.
What is also striking are the changes in the relative contribution from the three elements over
the simulation period. In particular, the contribution from the UI benet extensions has been
increasing. This can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 9. From 2007 until 2009 when the unemploy-
ment rate was rising, a large majority of the rise in the unemployment rate was coming from
increasing separations. However, as the UI benet extensions started being enacted, the contri-
bution from the UI benet extensions continued to rise. As of the end of 2010, the contribution
from the UI benet extensions reaches 1.4 percentage points, while the contribution from the
separation and the job-nding rates are 2.0 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. This change
of composition is due to the fact that the separation rate shifted down in 2010 (See Figure 1),
while UI benets extensions are continuously renewed.
The eect from the UI benet extensions to the unemployment rate is signicantly aected
by the economic condition. This is shown in panel (b) of Figure 9 as \UI benets extensions
(alternative)." In particular, I show the changes in the unemployment rate when only the UI
benet extensions are implemented without the changing separation rate or the loading factor
from their steady-state levels. The eect of the extensions on the unemployment rate is measured
to be smaller than the number computed above. On average between August 2008 and December
2010, the contribution is 0.75 percentage point instead of 1.23 percentage points. The main reason
is that a higher separation pushes more workers into unemployment, which makes the eect of
discouraged search eorts on the unemployment rate greater.
Finally, remember that the eect of extending the duration of UI benets up to 99 weeks
on the unemployment rate is 1.7 percentage points in the steady-state analysis (Table 5). The
dierence from the transition analysis (1.2 percentage points) highlights the importance of taking
the gradual and temporary nature of the ongoing UI extensions in evaluating its implications.
27In other words, if the currently available duration of UI benets were made permanent, the
unemployment rate would be pushed up further by 0.5 percentage point.
7.2 Policy Experiments: Counterfactual UI Benet Extensions
The last UI benet extension was agreed between the President and Congress in December 2010.
This last extension does not increase the maximum duration of UI benets (which remains at
99 weeks), but it allows those who did not exhaust the maximum duration of benets and at
the same time did not qualify for some of benets because of the deadline to apply for a higher
tier. The focus of the discussion regarding the last extension was mainly its implication on
government nances, especially after the outstanding balance of the government debt soared
with series of scal stimuli, and how it helps the long-term unemployed. Although both issues
are important, the extension also has a negative eect on the search eort, which is the main
focus of the current paper. In trying to quantify the eect, I run a counterfactual experiment
in the model economy where the last extension in the model is not implemented. Panel (a) of
Figure 10 compares the dynamics of the unemployment rate under the baseline transition path,
where all nine extensions are implemented, and under the counterfactual transition path, where
the last extension (December 2010) is not implemented. As you can see, when the labor market
condition improves (by assumption) and the economy reverts back to its steady state, the last
extension keeps the unemployment rate higher during the transition. In other words, the decline
in the unemployment rate would be faster in the counterfactual case without the last extension.
The dierence in the unemployment rate is at most 0.4 percentage point during mid-2011 and 0.3
percentage point on average in 2011. While the unemployment rate in the baseline case reaches
6 percent in January 2012, the economy will achieve a 6 percent unemployment rate one month
earlier (December 2011) under the counterfactual scenario without the last extension. Needless
to say, in evaluating the last extension, one has to compare the cost of slower recovery shown
here, with the insurance provided to those who are unemployed, and scal implications. This is
left for future research. Finally, the extreme case in which no UI benet extension is implemented
is shown in panel (b) of Figure 10. In that scenario, the highest unemployment rate during the
recent downturn would have been around 9 percent instead of 10 percent. As of December 2010,
the unemployment rate under the counterfactual scenario is about 8 percent, as the contribution
to a higher unemployment rate by UI benet extensions increases.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
I explore the sensitivity of the main results, which is the eect of UI benet extensions on the
unemployment rate, regarding the most important parameter, , and the curvature parameter of
the matching function, . Table 6 summarizes the results. Let's start from  (second column).
 determines the strength of the response in terms of the search eort to the returns from search.
In the baseline calibration,  is calibrated to be 1:7. With the baseline calibration, the mean
unemployment duration by UI-eligible unemployed workers increases by 0.5 weeks when the
replacement rate of UI benets is increased by 10 percentage points. A response of 0.5 weeks is
the lower bound of the existing empirical estimates, although Hamermesh (1977) argues that it
is the best point estimate. In an alternative calibration, I set  = 1:0. The response of the mean
unemployment duration becomes 0.7 weeks, which is higher than 0.5 weeks, but still within the
range of existing empirical estimates (0.5-1.5 weeks). Under this alternative calibration, what
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Economy Baseline  = 1:0  = 0:5
 in unemployment duration of UI-eligible
10%  in replacement ratio 0.51 0.70 0.52
1 week  in UI benet duration 0.14 0.18 0.14
 in the unemployment rate during 2008
Total (percentage points) 5.1 5.1 5.0
Due to UI benet extensions 1.2 1.7 1.3
Due to  in separation rate 2.4 2.6 2.8
Due to  in job nding rate 1.4 0.7 0.9
is the contribution of UI benet extensions to the observed increase in the unemployment rate?
The answer is 1.7 percentage points, which is about a third of the total observed increase in
unemployment in 2008. Importantly, the number is substantially higher than the baseline result
of 1.2 percentage points. The contribution from the loading factor to matching eciency, or the
job-nding rate is reduced by half (1.4 to 0.7 percentage points). This is because the drop in
the loading factor is calibrated to be substantially smaller in the alternative calibration to match
the same level of the unemployment rate, with the stronger disincentive eect from UI benet
extensions.
In the third column, the sensitivity analysis with respect to  is shown. The changes in the
average unemployment duration by UI-eligible workers in the alternative model with  = 0:5
are quite similar to the changes in the baseline model. In terms of the main result of the paper,
which is the contribution of the UI benet extensions to the unemployment rate, the alternative
model with  = 0:5 generates a 1.3 percentage point increase instead of the baseline result of
a 1.2 percentage point increase. In the alternative model, the contribution of the time-varying
loading factor to matching eciency, or the job-nding rate, is smaller; the contribution declines
from the baseline number of 1.4 percentage points to 0.9 percentage point. The contribution of
the time-varying separation rate also becomes greater in the alternative model; the contribution
of the changes in the separation rate is 2.8 percentage points instead of 2.4 percentage points.
8 Conclusion
This paper measures the eect of extensions of UI benets on the unemployment rate using a
calibrated structural model that features job search and consumption-saving decision, skill depre-
ciation, UI eligibility, and a series of UI benet extensions that capture the UI benet extensions
that have been enacted during the current downturn. By using a structural model, I can capture
the eect of UI benet extensions on the unemployment rate and other macroeconomic aggre-
gates, properly taking into account the gradual and temporary nature of the recent extensions.
Moreover, a structural model enables counterfactual experiments. I nd that the extensions of
UI benets contributed to an increase in the unemployment rate by 1.2 percentage points, with
a baseline conservative calibration. Since unemployment went up by 5.1 percentage points, from
4.8 percent before the current downturn started at the end of 2007 to 9.9 percent in the fall
29of 2009, the contribution of the series of UI benet extensions is about a quarter (24 percent).
Among the remaining 3.9 percentage points, 2.4 percentage points are due to the large increase
in the separation rate, while the staggering job-nding probability contributes 1.4 percentage
points. I also nd that the last extension moderately slows down the recovery of the unemploy-
ment rate. Specically, the model indicates that the last extension keeps the unemployment rate
higher by up to 0.4 percentage point during 2011.
Three directions of future research are worth mentioning. First, the model in this paper can be
extended to a general equilibrium model with the production sector, the labor force participation
decision, and the government budget constraint. The decline in the search eort has a general
equilibrium eect, as employment declines while capital stock increases. Introducing the labor
force participation decision also allows us to investigate the discouraged worker eect. Second,
the model can be used to study the optimal UI program. The moral hazard eect of generous UI
benets has been studied extensively because it has a strong implication on the optimal design of
the UI program; generally, a stronger moral hazard eect implies the optimal UI benets to be less
generous. The model developed in this paper can be used to investigate the optimal UI program
using a calibrated structural model. Although there are attempts to investigate the optimal UI
program, an analysis with a carefully calibrated structural model has an advantage as the key
to answer the question is to compare the relative importance of dierent eects. Third, there
is an ongoing discussion about identifying structural and cyclical changes in unemployment. In
order to address the issue, the model can be extended by introducing elements that could change
the structural unemployment, such as changes in technology, distribution of skills, demography,
permanent policy, or family structure.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual Experiment: Without UI Benet Extension.
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